It has been argued that terrorism should not have a large effect on economic activity, because terrorist attacks destroy only a small fraction of the stock of capital of a country (see, e.g., Becker and Murphy, 2001) . In contrast, empirical estimates of the consequences of terrorism typically suggest large effects on economic outcomes (see, e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) . The main theme of this article is that mobility of productive capital in an open economy may account for much of the difference between the direct and the equilibrium impact of terrorism. We use a simple economic model to show that terrorism may have a large impact on the allocation of productive capital across countries, even if it represents a small fraction of the overall economic risk. The model emphasizes that, in addition to increasing uncertainty, terrorism reduces the expected return to investment. As a result, changes in the intensity of terrorism may cause large movements of capital across countries if the world economy is sufficiently open, so international investors are able to diversify other types of country risks. Using a unique dataset on terrorism and other country risks, we find that, in accordance with the predictions of the model, higher levels of terrorist risks are associated with lower levels of net foreign direct investment positions, even after controlling for other types of country risks. On average, a standard deviation increase in the terrorist risk is associated with a fall in the net foreign direct investment position of about 5 percent of GDP. The magnitude of the estimated effect is large, which suggests that the "open-economy channel" impact of terrorism may be substantial.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the effects of terrorism in an integrated world economy. From an economic standpoint, terrorism has been described to have four main effects (see, e.g., US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 2002) . First, the capital stock (human and physical) of a country is reduced as a result of terrorist attacks. Second, the terrorist threat induces higher levels of uncertainty. Third, terrorism promotes increases in counter-terrorism expenditures, drawing resources from productive sectors for use in security. Fourth, terrorism is known to affect negatively specific industries such as tourism. In this article, we use a stylized macroeconomic model of the world economy and international data on terrorism and the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) assets and liabilities to study the economic effects of terrorism in an integrated world economy.
The motivation to study the impact of terrorism in an open world economy is the following. It has been documented that the direct impact of terrorist attacks on productive capital is relatively modest. This seems to be true even for events of catastrophic terrorism. For example, Becker and Murphy (2001) estimated that the September 11th terrorist attacks resulted in a loss of 0.06 percent of the total productive assets of the US economy.
In consequence, after taking into account the four channels mentioned in the previous paragraph, some authors have argued that terrorism is unlikely to exert a significant influence on economic activity in the long-run. The calculations in Becker and Murphy (2001) bound the long-run effect of the September 11th attacks to 0.3 percent of GDP (see also IMF, 2001a and OECD, 2001 ).
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In contrast, reduced-form estimates of the economic effects of terrorism typically suggest much larger effects, at least in those areas where the risk of terrorism is particularly severe or sustained. For example, in our previous study of the impact of terrorism in the Basque Country, we find a 10 percent drop in per capita GDP which emerges during a period of two decades and that is attributable to the terrorist conflict (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) . Chen and Siems (2004) , Enders and Sandler (1996) , and Pshisva and Suarez (2006) , among others, similarly find large effects of terrorism on economic variables.
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However, as noted by Becker and Rubinstein (2004) , the question of why terrorism may have a large effect on the economy, even if it represents a small fraction of the total economic risk, has attracted much less attention in the academic literature.
The main theme of this paper is that mobility of productive factors in an open economy may account for much of the difference between the direct effect and the equilibrium effect of terrorism on the economy. If terrorism is a local phenomenon, capital will tend to flow to destinations without a terrorist threat, reducing net foreign investment in the economies affected by terrorism. Even if terrorism is a global threat, international investment will respond to differences in the expected intensity of terrorism across countries. In fact, because the optimal allocation of capital across countries depends not only on the level of terrorism but also on other country factors that affect the distributions of the returns to capital, variations in the overall level of terrorism in the world may induce a re-allocation of capital across countries even if the relative intensity of terrorist risk across countries remains unchanged.
The amounts of foreign direct investment in the U.S. before and after the September Of course, not all this variation in FDI can be attributed to the effect of the September 11th attacks. As of September 2001 foreign direct investment inflows had fallen from its 2000 peak not only in the U.S. but also in other developed economies (see UNCTAD, 2002) . These figures, however, motivate the question of to which extent an increase in the perceived level of terrorism was responsible for the drop in FDI in the U.S. that followed the events of September 11th.
Surveys of international corporate investors provide direct evidence of the importance of terrorism on foreign investment. Corporate investors rate terrorism as one of the most important factors influencing their foreign direct investment decisions (see Global Business
Policy Council, 2004) .
To illustrate the importance of the "open-economy channel" of terrorism we use a stochastic version of the AK endogenous growth model (see, e.g., Obtsfeld, 1994, and Turnovsky, 1997) . We extend this model by introducing terrorism as a stochastic Poisson process, with events that destroy some fraction of the capital stock of a country.
The model emphasizes that beyond increasing uncertainty, terrorism reduces the expected return to investment. As a result, changes in the intensity of terrorism have an ambiguous effect on the overall investment position of the world (investments over wealth), but they may cause large movements of capital across countries if the world economy is sufficiently open, so international investors are diversified against other types of country risks.
One of the predictions of our model is that, like any other risk, terrorism should affect the stock of international investment in any particular country. Therefore, it is possible to obtain empirical evidence on the "open-economy channel" of terrorism by looking at the relationship between the stock of net foreign investment and terrorism in the cross-section of countries, as long as we account for other factors that affect international investment positions, particularly other country risks which may be correlated with terrorism levels.
For this purpose, we use a unique international dataset on terrorism risk and other types of country risks. We find that terrorism has a negative and sizeable impact on foreign investment positions. Enders and Sandler (1996) have also studied the effect of terrorism on capital flows across countries. Using vector autoregression methods, these authors estimate a negative 13.5 percent effect of terrorism on foreign direct investment for Spain (for the period 1976-91) and a negative 11.9 percent effect for Greece (for the period 1975-91). Our empirical results for a cross-section of countries corroborate and provide external validity to the results of Enders and Sandler. In addition, Enders, Sachsida and Sandler (2006) find that terrorist attacks against US interests in OECD countries significantly reduced stocks of US direct investment. In related research, Blomberg and Mody (2005) , report a significant effect of violence (including terrorism) on the inflow of direct investment in a sample of 43 countries.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we built a simple model that illustrates why terrorism may have a large effect on net foreign investment in an open world economy even if terrorism induces only a small fraction of the total economic risk.
Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 provides empirical evidence on the effect of terrorism on foreign direct investment. Section 5 concludes.
A Simple Model of Catastrophic Terrorism

The Model
Consider a two-country economy with terrorism and perfect capital mobility across countries. We will refer to one of the countries as the "domestic economy" and to the other as the "foreign economy". The world population consists of a continuum of identical and infinitely-lived agents with mass equal to one, who are equally distributed among the two countries. At each point in time, t, agents decide how much to consume, C(t), and which fraction, v(t), of the capital to devote to production in the domestic economy (with a fraction 1 − v(t) devoted to production in the foreign economy). If the fraction of capital devoted to a country changes, this change generates a flow of investment from one country to the other.
As in Obstfeld (1994) and Turnovsky (1997) , we assume that production in the domestic economy is given by a stochastic AK technology:
where dY (t) is output, K(t) is the world stock of capital (physical and human), and W (t) is a Wiener process, whose innovations capture domestic productivity shocks.
The assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect capital mobility across countries are not totally innocuous. These assumptions increase the sensitivity of the allocation of capital across countries to differences in the distributions of the return to capital between countries. The assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect capital mobility across countries are likely to be violated in the short run. However, these assumptions are consistent with the long run trends in the allocation of capital across countries.
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Terrorist attacks in the domestic economy are captured in this model as innovations from a Poisson process, P (t) with rate λ, which destroy a fraction δ of the stock of capital allocated by every investor to the domestic economy, with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. After the direct impact of terrorism is taken into account, the return to capital in the domestic economy is governed by a jump-diffusion:
By the properties of Wiener and Poisson processes, the expectation and variance of the return to capital in the domestic economy are:
Because terrorism is a one-sided risk (that is, because it produces negative shocks only), an increase in the intensity of domestic terrorism, λ, not only increases the variance of the return to capital but it also reduces its mean. The one-sided risk nature of terrorism is crucial to derive the results below.
Production and terrorism follow analogous processes in the foreign economy, for which we will use the notation:
, and dP * (t).
Agents derive instantaneous utility from consumption, C(t), through a constant relative risk aversion utility function: u(c) = (c Agents choose C(t) and v(t) to maximize lifetime discounted utility, subject to the law of motion for capital. Because all agents have the same preferences and investment possibilities, regardless of how ownership of productive capital is distributed, the equilibrium in the world economy is given by the solution of the utility maximization problem for a representative agent:
Appendix A provides a detailed derivation of the solution. The optimal consumption plan is:
where v is the optimal share of world capital invested in the domestic economy, which is implicitly determined by:
Notice that equation (3) implies that the optimal share of capital invested in the domestic economy is constant, for any given values of the parameters of the model.
Let θ be the fraction of the world's productive capital owned by residents of the domestic economy. Domestic consumption and wealth are equal to θC(t) and θK(t) respectively.
Similarly, foreign consumption and wealth are equal to (1 − θ)C(t) and (1 − θ)K(t). In this economy, domestic and foreign residents hold the same portfolio of assets, a share in the world portfolio. Hence, the distribution of consumption and wealth among countries depends only on the value of θ. However, the distribution of the stock of capital between countries depends on the intensity of terrorism in both countries and the other parameters of the model.
The Effects of Terrorism
In this economy, terrorism affects capital accumulation through three different channels.
First, terrorist events directly destroy part of the capital stock of a country, δ. As explained above, in practice, the quantitative importance of this effect seems to be small.
Second, terrorism changes the process that determines the return to capital, affecting the overall investment position of the individuals in the world economy. However, the direction of this second effect is theoretically ambiguous. In the absence of a terrorist attack, every unit of capital is either consumed or saved as productive capital. Let π C = C(t)/K(t) be the consumption-wealth ratio. Differentiating π C with respect to λ and using equation (3) we obtain:
As shown in equation (4), terrorism increases the consumption-wealth ratio if γ < 1 and decreases the consumption-wealth ratio if γ > 1. The reason is that terrorism reduces the average return to investment and increases its variance. As a result, terrorism induces a negative income effect and a positive substitution effect on consumption. The negative income effect dominates when γ > 1. However, the positive substitution effect dominates for individuals with risk aversion smaller than that given by logarithmic utility. To investigate the effect of terrorism on net foreign investment, we differentiate equation (3) with respect to λ:
Last equation shows that, in the model, terrorism has an unambiguously negative effect on v. Notably, the magnitude of this effect is unbounded. In this simple two-country model, the effect of terrorism on capital allocation across countries will be small if the direct impact of terrorist attacks, represented by δ, is small, as long as the degree of risk aversion of international investors, γ, is relatively large. However, if international investors are close to risk neutrality (if γ is close to zero), terrorist risk will have a large effect on the allocation of capital across countries. The reason is that, in contrast to smooth risk, an increase in the intensity of catastrophic terrorism not only increases the variance of the return to investment, it also decreases its average. Investors with low levels of risk aversion have no reason to diversify country risk, and react abruptly to relative changes in the intensity of terrorism.
This may be an important consideration in practice. If international investors are sufficiently diversified, they will have no reason to invest in countries with relatively high levels of terrorist risk (if it is difficult to diversify terrorist risk locally). To illustrate this point, suppose that the world economy consists of N economies (the domestic economy plus N − 1 foreign countries). To simplify the exposition, assume that only the domestic economy is exposed to terrorism and that in the absence of a terrorist shock production in country i (i = 1, ..., N ) is given by the stochastic process
where W 1 , ..., W N are independent Wiener processes. As before, terrorism in the domestic economy is described by a Poisson process with coefficients (λ, δ). In this scenario, the fraction of world's capital invested in the domestic economy, v, is given by:
If there is no terrorism (λ = 0), then the domestic economy receives a fraction 1/N of world's capital. If there is terrorism in the domestic economy but not in the rest of the
, so for any given value of γ, the ratio v/(1/N ) will be small when the number of countries, N , is large. The reason is that when investment can be placed in many countries international investors are able to diversify risk without allocating capital to countries with a higher relative risk of terrorism and therefore with a lower expected return. Rather than trying to capture all the channels through which terrorism may affect economic outcomes, the simple model presented in this section emphasizes that the diversification opportunities that arise in an integrated world economy can greatly amplify the economic impact of terrorism (and, more generally, the impact of any one-sided risk). This result is important because it suggests that, in an increasingly globalized world economy, the "open-economy channel" may explain much of the difference between the direct and the equilibrium impact of terrorism.
Model interpretation and empirical design
The equilibrium portrayed by our model can be interpreted as a description of the long-run relationship between terrorism risk and international investment positions at the country level. Because the model lacks transitional dynamics, it cannot effectively describe shortrun capital movements in response to variations in the intensity of terrorism. Moreover, because diminishing returns to capital and adjustment costs are expected to be substantial in the short run, a study of the effects of changes in the intensity of terrorism on shortrun capital movements will underestimate the long-run impact of terrorism. Therefore, we choose to investigate the long-run effect of terrorism on international investment positions rather than on capital flows.
We restrict the empirical analysis to direct investment, and do not consider debt and portfolio investment. The reason is that debt and portfolio investment are heavily affected by financial crises, the degree of development of the countries' financial institutions, and complicated capital control schemes.
The empirical evidence is based on a cross-section of countries. While measures of terrorism risk in the cross-section of countries exist, we currently lack adequate longitudinal risk data to conduct a direct study of capital flows. In principle, short term variations in terrorist risk levels could be used in a fixed-effects model to estimate the effect of terrorism on foreign direct investment while controlling for unobserved determinants of foreign direct investment that are fixed in the short run. In practice, however, the use of longitudinal data on terrorist risk would be extremely problematic. On the one hand terrorist risk does not seem to display much short-term variation.
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On the other hand, it may be difficult to establish the exact timing of the impact of a change in terrorist risk on foreign direct investment. International investors may perceive short term changes in terrorist risk before or after the risk rating data indicate, and the response of foreign direct investment to short term changes in the level of terrorist risk may be attenuated in the short run by the irreversible nature of direct investment.
Finally, notice that short-term longitudinal data on terrorist events or casualties may not be adequate to estimate the impact of terrorism risk in a fixed effects model. The reason is that, in most countries, terrorist incidents are low-probability events. Therefore, shortterm variation in the level of terrorist activity may be large even if the underlying level of terrorist risk experiences little variation. In other words, terrorist events or casualties are noisy measures of the latent level of terrorist risk. As a result, the regression coefficients on variables measuring terrorist events or casualties will be biased towards zero. Time differencing the data in a fixed effects model is known to exacerbate errors-in-variables biases (Griliches and Hausman, 1986) . In addition, the use of direct indicators of terrorist events or casualties present other problems, which are described in Section 3.
Of course, the main disadvantage of using cross-sectional data is the potential for omitted variable bias. To address this problem we perform a careful sensitivity analysis and demonstrate that the results of the empirical section are robust to many different specifications.
The Data
The model we developed in the previous section predicts that, even if terrorist attacks destroy only a small fraction of the productive capital of a country, increases in terrorist risk may greatly affect the allocation of international investment across countries. In the next section, we use a unique dataset on terrorist and other country risks to quantify the impact of terrorism on net foreign direct investment (net FDI) Terrorist risk ratings, like the GTI, do not suffer from these drawbacks and incorpo-6 FDI assets (liabilities), are defined as the value of capital and reserves, including retained profits, invested in a foreign (the domestic) economy attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprise resident in the domestic (a foreign) economy. Data on FDI stocks is at book value or historical cost, reflecting prices at the time when the investment was made.
7 See World Markets Research Centre (2003) for further information on the Global Terrorism Index.
rate information that relate to risk but are not reflected in casualties, like motivation of terrorists or prevention by the authorities. Moreover, because risk ratings are commonly used by international investors to evaluate specific country risks, they have the advantage of directly reflecting one of the most important channels through which information about terrorism risk is revealed to international investors. Consequently, terrorism risk ratings are particularly relevant as a measure of terrorism risk to evaluate the effect of terrorism on international investment. A disadvantage of terrorism risk ratings is that they provide only a summary measure of an intrinsically complex phenomenon.
Like any other risk, terrorism should depress the stock of international investment in any particular country. Therefore, empirical evidence on the "open-economy channel" of terrorism can be obtained using a cross-section of countries. In our regressions, we measure the amount of variance of net FDI stock (normalized by the country GDP) explained by terrorist risk. Because international investors take into account other types of risk factors such as the overall political, legal, and security environments of the target country, this exercise must acknowledge sources of risk other than terrorism. As we will show below, these other risk factors correlate with terrorist risk. Therefore, it is important to control in our regressions for other risk factors which may also affect foreign investment. Risk rating data allow us to do exactly this. We include in our regressions a country risk index also produced by the World Markets Research Centre (WMRC). The WMRC Country Risk Index combines six risk factors (political, economic, legal, tax, operational, and security) into an overall country risk index.
As explained in the previous section, the net foreign investment position of a country is affected by the fraction of world's productive capital owned by the residents of that country. Because rich countries have higher per capita levels of capital, we include in our regressions the countries' levels of GDP per capita as an explanatory variable (these data come from the World Bank, 2004).
Of course, the stock of foreign investment of a country depends crucially on the degree of the country's openness to capital mobility. To measure the degree of openness of a country to foreign capital we use the index of capital flows and foreign investment restrictions published as a factor of the Index of Economic Freedom by The Heritage Foundation and
The Wall Street Journal (Miles et al, 2004) . The coefficient on the Global Terrorism Index in column (2) remains negative and significant after including log GDP per capita in the regression specification. As expected, log GDP per capita exhibits also a negative regression coefficient. The results remain similar when we include regional dummies in the regression specification in column (3).
In column (4) we include other potential determinants of foreign investment: a measure of the severity of the barriers to foreign capital and the WMRC Country Risk Index.
As expected, the new variables exhibit negative coefficients. The inclusion of the overall country risk index and the other new variables leaves the coefficient on the Global Terrorism
Index with a value of -0.21 percent of GDP and significant at the 10% level.
As explained above, because one component of the security factor of the Country Risk
Index is a measure of terrorism, the coefficient on the Global Terrorism Index in column (4) incorporates a positive bias relative to a hypothetical regression using a measure of country risks which does not account for terrorism. Therefore, the coefficient on the Global
Terrorism Index in column (4) can be interpreted as an upper bound on the coefficient of interest (that is, it underestimates the negative impact of terrorism on net FDI). To obtain a lower bound, in column (5) we estimate the same specification as in column (4) 
Robustness Analysis
In this section we perform several robustness checks on the specification of the regression equation. We extend the regression equation to include demographic factors, human capital, governance indicators, macroeconomic risk, financial factors, and other variables that could potentially affect the net FDI positions.
Demographic Factors
As a first robustness check we include in our regression demographic factors. The population age-structure may affect foreign direct investment. Life-cycle theory suggests that countries with young populations should be net debtors to the rest of the world. In addition, multinational corporations engaging in FDI often target countries where the population is young, so labor is an abundant production factor. Furthermore, the empirical evidence in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) indicates that demographic factors exert a significant effect on the net foreign assets position of countries, especially for the developing world.
In Table 4 we expand the set of explanatory variables by including demographic factors:
the fraction of population under age 14, and the fraction of the population over age 65.
The results of columns (1) to (4) indicate that our prior results are robust against the inclusion of measures of the percentages of the population under age 14 and over age 65.
These age-range population variables exhibit statistically significant coefficients only when included together, as in columns (3) and (4).
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Countries' levels of human capital plausibly influence international investment positions.
In order to determine the importance of human capital in the determination of net FDI positions we have included in column (5) of Table 4 a proxy for human capital, the net enrollment rate in primary school. These data, from United Nations Educational Scientific 9 The fractions of population under 14 and over 65 are negatively correlated in our sample, with correlation coefficient equal to -0.9188. This strong negative correlation along with the negative regression coefficients on the two variables implies that when one of them is omitted from the regression the coefficient on the included variable will include a positive bias.
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), were available for 80 countries of the regression sample. We find that the coefficient on the enrollment rate is not statistically significant.
The inclusion of this variable in the regression increases the standard errors of the other estimated coefficients and renders them insignificant (probably because of a combination of the smaller sample size on the regression in column (5) and the high correlation between enrollment rate and other included variables). 
Other Types of Country Risks
While this paper focuses on terrorist risk, other types of country risk may be important in international investment decisions. Here we test the robustness of our findings on terrorist risk by including in our specification the factors that are used to calculate the WMRC Country Risk Index.
The WMRC Country Risk Index used in our regressions accounts for political, economic, legal, tax, operational, and security factors by aggregating them into a single measure of country risk. The political factor measures political instability and indicates how mature and well-established the political system is. The economic factor assesses the economic stance of the country in terms of the freedom of market forces and the macroeconomic fundamentals of the economy. The legal factor indicates how well-established the legal system is and whether necessary business laws are in place. The tax factor measures the coherence and fairness of the tax system as well as the overall level of taxes. The operational factor is an assessment of the degree of openness to FDI, the quality of infrastructure, how well the labor market functions, and bureaucracy and corruption. Finally, the security factor measures threats originating from civil unrest, crime, terrorism, as well as external threats. Table 5 reports regressions where we have included political, economic, legal, tax, operational, and security factors. None of the first five factors significantly influence foreign direct investment positions either taken together (column (1)) or one at a time (columns (2)-(6)). The previous results for terrorist risk and the other explanatory variables remain robust across these regressions. In column (7), we introduce in the regression the security factor of the WMRC Country Risk Index (which includes terrorist risk) in lieu of the WMRC Global Terrorism Index. The coefficient on the security factor is negative and statistically significant. The results in Table 5 suggest that terrorism and, more generally, security are among the most apparent country-specific determinants of the stock of net FDI.
Governance Indicators
Here we test the robustness of our findings against potential omitted governance variables that may be important determinants of net FDI positions. To control for corruption and other forms of mis-governance, we employ a data set compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004) The political stability indicator, which incorporates (lack of) terrorism, exhibits a high correlation with the WMRC Global Terrorism Index in Table 2 . We report the regression results including these six indicators of governance in columns (1)-(6) of Table 3 . None of the coefficients of these indicators are statistically significant. More importantly, with the exception of column (2) the regression coefficient on the terrorism risk variable remains virtually unchanged through these regressions. The relative change of the coefficient on terrorism risk in column (2) reflects the mechanical relationship between the index of political stability and terrorism. In addition, the inclusion of the political stability index in the regression increases the standard error of the regression coefficient on the terrorism index variable, due to the high correlation between the political stability index and the GTI. The results in Table 6 indicate that, when we include the corrected Country Risk Index and the other previously tested variables in our regression, additional indicators of quality of governance do not have a significant effect on net FDI positions.
Financial Factors, Macroeconomic Risk, and Natural Disasters
International capital flows have been found to depend on the degree of financial development in a country (see, e.g., Albuquerque, Loayza and Servén, 2005) . In a general sense, stock markets facilitate the flow of a significant share of foreign direct investment. Furthermore, newly established foreign firms, both those acquired through the stock market and those established as foreign direct investments, require financial services. Thus, as they make investment decisions foreign investors should account for the degree of development of a country's financial sector, and particularly the development of the banking sector, as both of these factors will affect the returns of their investments. The first column of Table 7 reports a regression where we include a common measure of financial development, the total volume of credit of the banking industry as a share of the GDP, as an additional explanatory variable. This measure of financial development does not exhibit a statistically significant coefficient and its inclusion renders most of the other regressors insignificant; the coefficient on the terrorism risk variable remains, however, marginally significant.
Exchange rate fluctuations affect international capital flows and stocks of foreign investment. Risk averse firms may decide not to invest in a country if exchange rate volatility is high (see, e.g., Campa, 1993) . We have constructed a measure of foreign exchange fluctua-tions as the range of variation of the real effective exchange rate over the 1994-2003 period.
Data availability for the construction of this variable restricts the sample to 55 countries only. The second column of Table 7 includes this measure of exchange rate fluctuations as an additional regressor. The evidence for this subsample indicates that this financial factor does not exhibit a significant coefficient and its inclusion renders the coefficient on the other regressors insignificant, potentially an effect of the small sample size.
It has been documented that a high degree of intervention of the government in the economy may deter foreign investment (see, e.g., Albuquerque, Loayza and Servén, 2005) .
Using the ratio of government consumption over GDP as a measure of government intervention, we obtain the results reported in column (3) Column (4) of Table 7 indicates that growth variability is not a significant determinant of the net foreign investment position. However, the coefficients on terrorist risk and the other explanatory variables remain significant.
The theoretical model developed in this article conceptualizes terrorism as one-sided catastrophic risk. However, terrorism is not the only instance of one-sided catastrophic risk.
To further validate our empirical findings, we include in column (5) of Table 7 If our empirical approach to investigate the effects of catastrophic risk on investment is appropriate, this new variable should exhibit a negative coefficient in our regression. Indeed, the coefficient on the earthquake risk variable is negative and significant at the 10% level. The inclusion of this variable in the regression 11 Natural disaster data are from the OFDA/CRED International Disasters Data Base.
leaves the coefficient of terrorist risk virtually unchanged.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that terrorism risk has significant explanatory power on net FDI investment positions. In principle, the impact of terrorism on FDI positions estimated in our regressions would be exacerbated if omitted determinants of FDI are negatively correlated with terrorism. We show, however, that our regression results are robust under alternative specifications, which control for a variety of factors suspected to affect foreign investment.
On the contrary, there are a number of reasons to believe that our estimates may be, in fact, conservative.
First, our estimates of the impact of terrorism on foreign investment will be biased by reverse causation if the presence of foreign capital in a country induces a terrorist response.
Notice however that, in this case, reverse causation would create a positive bias in the estimated coefficient on terrorism risk. Because we estimate a negative coefficient on the terrorism risk variable, the potential bias created by reverse causation would not change the qualitative conclusions of this study, i.e. the true coefficient would also be negative but larger in absolute value.
Moreover, notice that most of the estimates in this section reflect the degree of statistical association between terrorism and net FDI positions over GDP holding constant the level of per-capita GDP of a country (and other explanatory variables). Therefore, our analysis will underestimate the long-run effects of a terrorist shock on an economy if foreign ownership of the capital of a country boosts the level of per-capita income of the country (e.g., via transfers of technology), and if increases in per-capita income tend to reduce the level of terrorism. Under these conditions the negative impact of a terrorism shock would be exacerbated by feedback effects.
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There are two additional reasons to believe that our estimates provide in fact a conser-12 However, empirical studies have failed to find evidence of the existence of a causal effect of per-capita income on terrorism. See Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Abadie (2006) . vative measure of the impact of terrorism on foreign direct investment. First, the country latent level of terrorist risk cannot be directly observed and the GTI will measure it with error. If terrorism measurement error is "classical" (additive and independent of the latent terrorist risk) our estimates will be biased towards zero. Second, our estimates of the effects of terrorism on capital flows are attenuated to the extend that they reflect only the impact on capital flows across countries. If terrorist risk levels vary within countries, the effect of terrorism on the regions that are most affected by it will be more severe than what our estimates suggest.
Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how terrorism influences the equilibrium decisions of international investors in an integrated world economy. We have introduced terrorism as catastrophic risk in a standard endogenous growth model and analyzed the effect of an increase in terrorist risk on the net FDI position of countries. The model suggests that in an integrated world economy, where international investors are able to diversify other country risks, terrorism may induce large movements of capital across countries. The empirical evidence, based on cross-country regressions, indicates that terrorist risk depresses net foreign investment positions. This relationship is robust to the introduction of demographic factors, country-specific risk indexes, governance indicators, and other financial and macroeconomic factors such as per capita GDP and FDI restrictions which might determine the country's FDI position.
Our estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the intensity of terrorism produces a 5 percent fall in the net FDI position of the country (normalized by GDP). Both the model and the empirical evidence suggest that the open economy channel may be an important avenue through which terrorism hurts the economy.
Appendix A: Solution to the model
For the model in Section II, the value function is:
where the maximum is taken over all feasible consumption plans. We impose the transver-
Notice that V (k) = e βt V (k, t) does not depend on t. Using this property of the value function the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation simplifies to:
Solving the maximization problem on the left-hand side of last equation, we obtain the following first-order conditions (FOC):
The second-order conditions (SOC) are:
Try the solution:
For the FOC, we obtain:
It is 
From the HJB equation, we obtain a value for µ
, where
As shown in section II:
Terrorism exerts a substitution and an income effect on consumption. To obtain the substitution effect, differentiate C with respect to λ for a fixed level of lifetime util-
. Differentiating this expression for V (0) = v 0 , we obtain:
The income effect is:
Given the form of the value function, the transversality condition for this problem becomes:
To verify this condition we first apply Ito's Lemma for jump-diffusions to obtain:
Therefore, ln K(t) is also a jump-diffusion. Notice that
.
Because ln K(t)
is also a jump-diffusion, we can apply the results in Duffie, Pan, and Singleton (2000) , to obtain (under regularity conditions):
a(t) = 0, and b(t) = 1 − γ. As a result, making s = 0, we obtain:
Therefore, the transversality condition holds if and only if π C > 0.
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